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Bernhard Sylla (Universidade do Minho)* 
I want to propose that Blumenberg’s work on technology be read as an expression of deep 
skepticism against any kind of unilateralism. The term uniliteralism can be understood here as 
denoting a basic feature of a worldview that has not yet given up hope of arriving at ultimate 
foundations and which – and I would like to focus on this aspect the most – makes the further 
mistake of suppressing the opposing side in any dialectic in order to preserve its own side and 
establish a firm support for further interpretation. This suppression of the opposing side also 
means that any sort of relationality between the two sides is either entirely effaced or it is 
expressed in a confused, attenuated form. This relationality and its qualities, i.e. relational 
properties (or, in Cassirer’s terminology: functional terms and functional properties instead of 
substance terms and substance properties), is thereby rendered inadmissibly fragmented or even 
completely ignored, leading to a false dogmatism. 
To look at things from only one side is blindness. In the philosophy of technology, one form of 
blindness is the hasty condemnation of the evil specter of technology (Heidegger, Anders, 
Blumenberg himself in his early writings). But an unreflective technophilia would also be narrow 
or blind (Kapp, Dessauer, the common-sense belief in the Idea of Progress). 
When it comes to the topic of technology, Blumenberg is concerned not only with understanding 
the grounds for a proper attitude or response towards technology but also with understanding 
technology itself as an actual phenomenon. A similar picture emerges here, even though the 
conceptual structure naturally shifts. For here too I take Blumenberg’s conviction about the need 
to overcome unilateralism and recognize bi- or plurilateralism to be an indispensable condition 
for an understanding of the phenomenon of technology, for a mature understanding that would 
be able to shed light on the network of complex relations involved in the phenomenon of 
technology. In various texts Blumenberg goes so far as to call this the task of philosophy (ST 18, 
193/94, 202). 
A first aim of my considerations is to argue for the theses presented above and to show how they 
can be found in Blumenberg’s work. 
It is also the case, or so it seems to me, that we have not yet brought to the fore another, 
complementary aspect of Blumenberg’s philosophy of technology. I would argue that it is 
precisely this aspect, which is especially attractive to situate Blumenberg in the context of 
Anders - Heidegger - Sloterdijk - Blumenberg. This aspect has to do with what crosses the 
boundaries of what is known to us, beyond the knowable and the sayable, and which extends 
from the metaphysical as well as the epistemological, the linguistic, and the ethical point of view 
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to the fundamental questions which never completely lose their grip on us. In my opinion, 
Blumenberg holds, on the one hand, an extreme, or, as an article in ZEIT1 puts it, a ‘skeptical 
skepticism’, i.e., a position that can be understood as an antidote against an irrational readiness to 
engage in radical speculations or dogmatic apocalyptic hysteria. On the other hand, I would 
argue, Blumenberg is fascinated by metaphysical questions, or, to put it more modestly, he 
cannot and will not ignore the fact that threads of arguments from the complex force fields of the 
knowable reach into the realm of the speculative, and that the latter plays a noteworthy 
contrastive role. In my opinion, the most important points of contact with the basic theses of 
Anders, Sloterdijk, and Heidegger are to be found here. I will not deal with this last aspect in 
detail, but only raise it as a question in anticipation of further work.  
 
False unilateralism 
False unilateralism can manifest itself in various forms or expressions. A first form, often 
referred to by Blumenberg, shows itself in a one-sided conception of the dependence relation that 
obtains between the overly broad and hence vague concepts of mind (Geist) and technology 
(Technik). Instead of a one-sided dependence, this relation is actually one of reciprocal 
interaction. This interaction can be expressed in a somewhat broad outline: technology is founded 
not only on motivations, on the development of ideas, on spiritual causes, but all of these are 
also supported precisely by technology itself. They are based on a technical-material state of 
reality, which serves at least in part as the material basis for the history and production of ideas. 
Blumenberg summed it up in a simple formula (GT 78/79): It is not just about the mind (Geist), 
which produces technology (Technik), but also about technology (Technik), which produces 
mind (Geist). The logical structure of this formula – not only … but also – is both, put 
negatively, vague enough and, put positively, developed enough to serve as the basis for a 
criticism that reveals the narrow-mindedness of theories that start from unilateral premises. As 
already mentioned, the first and main error of more limited or narrow-minded theories would be 
the neglect of the fact that technology also produces the mind rather than strictly just the other 
way around. According to Blumenberg, it is often overlooked that a certain factual state of 
material development was a necessary condition for the very origin and development of certain 
ideas. The invention of the elevator and the telescope can be used as illustrative examples, 
rendering this premise obvious. As Blumenberg (GT 74) notes, the invention of the elevator, for 
example, the development of vertical transportation, came about only when there were already 
high-rise buildings. It can be understood as the result of an attention to certain problems which 
came to the fore only by the prompting of specific factual circumstances (high-rise buildings) 
that did not exist before. Likewise, the invention and construction of the telescope is not the 
result of the desiderata of astronomical research, but of a new technological-material facticity 
arising from entirely different motivations. It is only when these become a given, a fact, and only 
because they become a given, that certain ideas can gain a foothold in technological 
advancement, and in some cases, such as the telescope, cause a “spiritual-historical leap” (GT 
44/45). 
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When, in the first section (ST 165-171), of his essay “Lifeworld and Technologization according 
to Phenomenology” (“Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter Aspekten der Phänomenologie”), 
Blumenberg criticizes two approaches in the philosophy of technology as too short-sighted, he 
means to correct not only his own earlier position, but also a fundamental shortcoming prevalent 
in the philosophy of technology of his day. Blumenberg takes two distinct fundamental 
assumptions to be false or at least too short-sighted: on the one hand, the assumption of an 
antithesis between nature and technology, on the other, the closely related thesis of the natural 
technicity of man. Both theses, I would assert, show the basic trait of a false unilateralism. It is 
wrong, according to Blumenberg, to conceive of technology as the arsenal of manufactured 
products, machinery, devices, as a “world-of-things/artifacts” (“Dingwelt”) or “universe of 
things/artifacts” (“Universum von Dingen”) (ST 165). The error lies in a coarse narrowing of 
perspective on the phenomenon of technology, since technology is seen in its artifact-character in 
contrast to non-artificial, natural things. Nature is conceived as the more fundamental, still 
unadulterated, real principle, as the basis and the forgotten arche of the derivative realm of an 
artificially produced second nature. Blumenberg notes self-critically in a footnote that this 
position had been defended in his earlier writings. At least as far as the valuing of the physis-
principle is concerned, Blumenberg’s critique of this position is directed especially at Heidegger, 
as well as at any technophobic philosophy which takes the distance to a primordial ‘ur’-nature as 
the basis for an hostility towards the artificial. According to this first theoretical critique, what is 
unilateral here is an understanding of technology according to which technology plays a purely 
dissociating and derivative role ultimately always leading back to nature. 
The second way in which this view of the phenomenon of technology is narrow-minded also has 
to do, albeit in a different way, with the presupposition of an antithesis between nature and 
technology, insofar as techne is conceived as a capacity for action, as man’s ability to define man 
via a knowledge that discloses itself in praxis and one which makes techne, as understood above, 
the prevailing and fundamental basis of a theoretical account of technology. It would be 
misguided here to look at manufacturing as the essential mark of technology and to think of the 
specificity of man as homo faber as a prior or even exclusive condition for a theory of 
technology. Blumenberg has Ernst Kapp particularly in mind. According to Kapp, human history 
can be fully explained in terms of the history of the development of better tools (ST 165). In my 
opinion, this is where it starts becoming difficult to understand Blumenberg’s critique. Theories 
in which technology is understood as a capacity of Man for technical production, in which 
practical forms of knowledge play a decisive role in some way or another, have appeared in very 
different and, in some cases, widely distinct forms during the twentieth century, so that an 
adequate and even strongly negative analysis of those theories cannot limit itself to attacking this 
simple criterion which in fact they all satisfy. I do not wish to assert here that Blumenberg 
himself has proceeded from the premise that this criterion was full-blooded. I wish only to be 
cautious, to make Blumenberg’s argument stronger than it actually is. For the theoretical focus 
on the elevation of practical know-how and the production and craft that follows from that know-
how could be attributed to those anthropological theories that see humans as deficient beings 
(Mängelwesen), theories in the vein of Herder, Scheler, Gehlen, Plessner, etc., but also, in a 
certain sense, the theories of Anders, Heidegger, and Sloterdijk. However, the differences 
between all these different theories would be lost in such a reductive view. I would like to return 
to this point at the end of my analysis. 
As the argument progresses, an argument which Blumenberg presents in “Lifeworld and 
Technologization according to Phenomenology”, the two forms of false unilateralism are, so to 
speak, gradually revealed. For this purpose, Blumenberg relies on Husserl’s concept of lifeworld 
(“Lebenswelt”). Although Blumenberg distances himself from the transposition of a non-
theoretical beginning into the course of history, as attempted by Husserl in several drafts of his 
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, he nevertheless 
appreciates the synchronous meaning of the Husserlian lifeworld, the “always underlying ground 
layer of life differentiated by different interest gradations” (ST 177) or, in other words, the 
“universe of self-evidence” (ST 178) or “the inexhaustible supply of unreflective and immediate 
existing, intimate, and unknown precisely in this intimacy” (ST 178). What Blumenberg 
appreciates in the late Husserl’s understanding of the nature of philosophy, is, if I may say so, 
this “synchronous” lifeworld concept that is tied to the retrogressive telos of the disclosure qua 
clarification of self-evident truths, truths which are given to us, just because of their fundamental 
self-evidence, only in a non-theoretical or pre-theoretical way, and which therefore can only be 
made reflectively available through theoretical effort. What he rejects as a dogmatic prejudice in 
the late Husserl is Husserl’s obsessive focus on the thesis that the work of understanding of pre-
theoretical premises in the modern age is always already on the way in the narrow course of 
scientific interpretation, without the modern man being aware of this. The irony in Blumenberg’s 
critique is that he denounces Husserl’s criticism of the unilateralism of his (Husserl’s) day, one 
which is unilaterally influenced by natural science, as unilateral. And that is how we arrived at 
Blumenberg’s own premise. Technology is not a result of an explanation of pre-theoretical 
certainties, which is reduced to naturalistic thought patterns and therefore both semi-consciously 
and semi-unconsciously explained, but technology emerges already in advance of science, i.e., in 
the pre-theoretical area of lifeworld experience and action. In Blumenberg’s own words: “But the 
sentence: The simple experience in which the lifeworld is given is the ultimate basis for all 
objective knowledge,2 is the basic requirement to understand the transformation of the lifeworld 
into an objectworld as itself arising out of the lifeworld and not as a kind of ‘original sin’ in the 
form of a voluntary act of the will [the will of the natural sciences; B. S.] which can no longer be 
investigated.” (ST 183). The bilateralism suggested by Blumenberg consists in placing the 
reciprocal interplay of the pre-theoretical, the “unknown” factual given, the basic motivations 
and basic interests on the one hand, and the patterns of models of cognitive interpretation, which 
are to be found in the complex structure of personal, socio-collective, and epochal dogmatics on 
the other. This is the precondition for a new theoretical reflection on technology. 
The willingness to admit of and engage in reciprocal perspectives – the lifeworld establishes the 
groundwork for theory, the theory works itself back onto the lifeworld and changes it – does not 
mean that one is ipso facto automatically protected from all unilateralism, as the example of 
Husserl shows. Nevertheless, for Blumenberg this willingness remains the central antidote 
against premature radicalisms. These radicalisms, in order to develop their dogmatics of alarm, 
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always require an inaccessible moment which, because of its inaccessibility, has a fatal 
impact. In Husserl, the unilateralism of a scientistic reason plays the part of the unknown and 
inaccessible crisis factor. Blumenberg, on the other hand, appeals to an attitude, which is 
skeptical and sober towards every hasty dogmatization. This skepticism can be put into practice 
in a number of ways. Thus, it is not necessarily disastrous, but in fact quite understandable, that 
certain research results and discoveries need not be arrived at via a continuous effort, but rather 
via a crystallized, formulaic form which determines both scientific methodology and daily 
practice. When I turn on the light switch or use a calculator, I do not necessarily need to be able 
to have the theoretical knowledge behind it. But that does not necessarily mean being at the 
mercy of the technical methods of dealing with things, but also the opening up of a room for new 
and free ideas and transformations in the forcefield of practice (praxis), theory and method. Nor 
does it mean that theory would be reduced to one definite theoretical methodology, i.e., a 
particular practice-oriented form of theory. If every such practice-oriented form of theory is 
recognized and taken seriously in its interwovenness with the lifeworld, then it can also be 
analyzed and corrected. 
The methodological aspects of this needed bilateralism would be further developed in the four 
years that followed the essay “Lifeworld and Technologization according to Phenomenology”, 
and presented in a clearer fashion in the essay “Methodological Problems of an Intellectual 
History of Technology” (ST 230-253 / GT 49-86). Methodology is theoretical practice (praxis), 
and, in the best case, practice, whose theoretical premises are reflectively accessible. If we are to 
write an intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte) of technology from the unilateral premise that 
mind is realized in the phenomena of technology, then all that remains for such history to do is 
ask about the source of motivation (the intellectual (geistige) origins) for putting the ideas into 
technological practice, or for providing a post factum justification or legitimization of this 
technological implementation of ideas. Instead Blumenberg suggests: 
“that the history of facts itself presented as a sequence of facts, thought of in temporal 
terms, not only ‘accompanies’ the reflective formation of ideas, but consists of a system 
of mutually-related effects resulting of the interaction between ideas and reality. It is 
necessary to see how open the questions here are and also what is to be demanded of the 
methodology which, by contrast to its precedent, is free from the prejudice of choosing 
between these alternatives.” (GT 54) 
According to Blumenberg, one consequence of this openness would be that the questions be 
asked in a “smaller” (GT 57) way, that is, that the interaction between theory, which is itself 
practice, and practice, which is theory laden, should not be hidden by assuming large scale 
premises which are often hastily assumed as foundational, for example, by assuming that 
practice is always the result of certain previous scientific methods of inquiry. 
This suggestion also contains a warning, which I have indicated here with the term “large scale 
premises”. This warning, which could be interpreted as a false bilateralism, should now be 
briefly discussed. 
 
Difficulties with bilateralism 
In 1961, Blumenberg gave a graduation address at the Justus Liebig University in Gießen 
entitled "World Images and World Models" (“Weltbilder und Weltmodelle”). The title itself 
already points to a kind of bilateralism. Blumenberg explains at the beginning of his address how 
he intended to use these terms: 
“I must explain these two terms. By “world model” I mean the total representation of the 
empirical reality as given by the state of the natural sciences and which incorporates the 
totality of scientific statements. By “world image,” I intend to denote the whole concept 
of reality in which and through which man understands himself, orientates his evaluations 
and action goals, grasps his possibilities and necessities, and shapes himself according to 
his essential needs. The world image has “practical power (praktische Kraft),” as Kant 
would say.” (ST 128-129) 
As far as the bilateralism of world image and world model is concerned, an intact bilateralism 
still prevailed until the modern age, although it should be noted that the world image occupied 
the guiding role: 
“The world image contained the meaning and, so to speak, the “instruction manual” for 
all conceivable world models. But this meant at the same time that no adequate 
understanding could be found within the world model concerning Man’s knowledge in 
itself. Science, having lost sight of the horizon of its own foundations, was unable to be 
reflectively aware of what it itself was doing.” (ST 129) 
On this point very close to Husserl, Blumenberg asserts that “the subordination of the world 
model to the world image is suspended” (ST 131). Not only that, but now the world model has 
taken over the place of the world image and is sapping the latter of its residual substance 
completely (ST 131). But here Blumenberg presents a decisive argument, one which brings him 
into a striking contrast with Husserl. According to Blumenberg, the function of the world image 
was “monistic” by nature (ST 133), and what ultimately led to the disappearance of a monistic 
world was the emergence of a plurality of world image surrogates. This historical “disaster 
(Unfall)” (ST 131) was irrevocable and irreversible. But what made this situation even more 
difficult was the fact that competition between the world images (or their surrogates) had been 
imperceptibly dominated by interests from “more commonplace areas (handfesteren Bereichen)” 
(ST 134). According to Blumenberg, “the discovery of how world images can be 
misappropriated and used as ideological instruments (...) definitely discredited the representation 
of the world as world images and made it impossible as a philosophical task” (ST 134). It would 
be false bilateralism therefore, if we were not to abandon the search for a final monistic world 
picture, or at least not to abandon the uncritical claim to being able to produce such a 
picture. This accusation would also have to be made to Husserl, but it likewise serves as an 
argumentative basis for the rejection of all those philosophers who still thought until the 1960s 
that such a comprehensively monistic interpretation of our “being-in-the-world” would be 
achievable. Nevertheless, according to Blumenberg, this does not mean that philosophy remains 
entirely without a task. Philosophy has the task, in a certain way reminiscent of Adorno, of 
critically reflecting on these interconnections. Furthermore, according to Blumenberg, theoretical 
insight into these interconnections has the positive function to make us immune to the unilateral 
temptation (cf. ST 136). A good dose of optimistic confidence lies here in the power of reason 
not only to resist the seduction of radical monisms, but also in its power to counter the 
undeniable dangers of an unreflective approach to technological development. This fundamental 
conviction may very well be regarded as the aspect in which Blumenberg distances himself most 
clearly from the dark, resigned philosophy of Adorno. The fact that Heidegger is to be counted 
among one of the main representatives of the radical monists, is something that the Blumenberg 
of the 1960s leaves no room for doubt, even though Blumenberg had had a quite positive attitude 
towards Heidegger in the 1950s.3 One of Blumenberg’s clearest and most devastating critiques 
can be read in his 1966’s book The Legitimacy of The Modern Age. In it, Blumenberg claims that 
Heidegger’s “pseudo theology” 
“gets its orientation from both the temporary and provisional status assigned to the age, 
as prior to a new and then perhaps final event in the “history of Being” – its turning to 
parousia [presence] – and the compellingly imposed, negative evaluation of the age, in 
which mythical rejection by the substitute for divinity, on the one hand, and the arrogance 
of the subjectivity that is a failure as far as ‘authenticity’ is concerned, on the other, make 
up a single integral state of affairs. The epoch appears as an absolute ‘fact’ [Faktum] – or 
better: as a ‘given’ [Datum]; it stands, sharply circumscribed, outside any logic, adapted 
to a state of error, and in spite of its immanent pathos of domination (or precisely on 
account of it) finally permits only the one attitude that is the sole option that the “history 
of Being” leaves open to man: submission. The absolutism of “Being” is in truth only the 
continuation of the medieval result by other means.” (LMA 192)  
The “stigmata of domination, of the serviceability of theory for technicity, of man’s self-
production” (ibid.) would be read precisely not as a response to an epochal challenge whose 
outcome is still undecided and which demands the careful vigilance of reason, but rather as the 
stigmata of an era of “the un-‘graced’ confusions surrounding the “Being” that has been 
withdrawn and concealed since the time of the Pre-Socratics.” (ibid.). 
 
Blumenberg’s ambivalent philosophical pathos 
Until now, I have tried – with the help of the concepts of unilateralism and bilateralism I have 
introduced – to show the development of a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of 
technology as first postulated by Blumenberg in the 1960s. Having made Blumenberg’s views 
explicit, in the next section of my analysis I would like to evaluate this view insofar as it bears 
some relation to the views of Anders, Heidegger and Sloterdijk. 
By entitling this section “Blumenberg’s ambivalent philosophical pathos,” I implicitly intend to 
assert the following: From the 1960s onwards, Blumenberg develops a sweeping aversion to any 
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theory that essentially espouses any sort of reductive reductionism. If one were to bring the 
predicate ‘fluid’ in the sense of Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘liquid’ into play here, one could also 
understand Blumenberg’s anti-radical plea as a strong appeal not to remetaphysicalize the fluid 
in a reductive manner and in a false fear of un-determinateness. Nevertheless, Blumenberg 
remains highly aware of the attraction, or in Heideggerian terms, of the risk (Wagnis), of 
borderline thought. These borderline thoughts appear both in positive and negative forms. One 
should therefore not make of borderline thought a kind of fetish. On the other hand, it cannot be 
denied that, like every phenomenon lying outside our horizon, the crossing of boundaries exerts a 
strong attraction. Curiosity (curiositas / cura)4, which had always – as Blumenberg masterfully 
shows in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age – been seen as a threat to willingly surrender to 
excess, reaches beyond its territorial boundaries into the realm of the insane, the lou-cura,5 
especially if it carries the exciting task of taking on the inherent potential of the “technical” 
Creator. In short, this means that in Blumenberg there remains a dilemma between a sober and 
objective endeavor for the non-reduction of complexity and rationality, an anti-dogmatism and 
anti-ideology, on the one hand, and a preserved sensitivity for the unworkable, the 
incomprehensible, the unspeakable and its explosive force, on the other. I would now like to 
briefly present some textual evidence for this thesis, in order to ultimately draw a final and 
problematizing conclusion. 
 
Sensitivity to the ‘Dangers’ of Technology 
There are three weighty objections, that Blumenberg himself invokes, against his reasonably 
moderate maxim of philosophy as a kind of watchdog. All three arguments come from the camp 
of the ‘radical monists’. 
The first objection claims the following: Technical development naturally acquires a certain 
momentum and tends to escape human control. This is also due to the fact that technical 
development does not take place solely on the basis of ‘endogenous motivations’, but is also 
increasingly a consequence of ‘exogenous motivations’. At first glance this seems to be a thesis 
that Blumenberg considered only in his early writings, writings such as “Atomic Morality – A 
Counterpart of the Nuclear Strategy” (“Atommoral – Ein Gegenstück zur Atomstrategie”) from 
1946, where we find, among other things, the statement that each power potential displays 
the immanent (and I stress immanent here) tendency to actualize itself qua potential (ST 
12). Five years later, in 1951, Blumenberg is already turning against positions that “demonize” 
technology. Still, he nevertheless affirms as an unmistakable fact that technology is increasingly 
acquiring characteristics that are threatening to “autonomy”, which manifests itself in its 
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“increasing unavailability for man” and in “drowning out his decisions, desires, needs through a 
dynamics of the object” (ST 18). This fundamental idea also appears repeatedly in later 
writings. In The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, it is, for example: 
“But there are phases of objectivization that lose themselves from their original 
motivation (the science and technology of the later phases of the modern age provide a 
stupendous example of this!), and to bring them back into their human function, to 
subject them again to man’s purposes in relation to the world, requires an unavoidable 
counterexertion.” (LMA 177) 
In “Lifeworld and Technologization according to Phenomenology”, Blumenberg speaks of a 
“pathology of technology,” which is, in principle, that the motivation inherent in technology is 
exogenous, it is “supplied from the outside,” but actually requires an endogenous motivation, 
which, when the day comes when there is a ‘global scale desideratum’ (“Desiderat in 
Weltmaßstab”), will have to catch up. One could argue that the last two quotations make it clear 
that in later writings Blumenberg minimizes the autonomy of technology and characterizes it as 
ultimately reflectively manageable. This is undoubtedly the case, but we are now, figuratively 
speaking, faced with a strong headwind brought about by a second objection, one which 
Blumenberg himself brings into question. 
The second objection is found in a particularly pure form in Günther Anders. It expresses the 
concern of an ever-widening discrepancy between the possibility of reflective control, the 
reflective or imaginative human capacity, and the dynamic development of the productive 
capacity. According to Anders, the gap between the rational capacities and the development of 
technological products becomes unclosable. In 1946 Blumenberg had launched the thesis that 
“this [the growing advances in atomic technology, B.S.] means an increase, a definiteness, and 
even an absolute ultimateness of technological autonomy, in such a way that exceeds the 
possibilities of even the liveliest and most consistent imagination.” (ST 11). Yet seventeen years 
later, in 1963, in “Lifeworld and Technologization according to Phenomenology”, Blumenberg, 
following Husserl, sketches a scenario according to which the technology implanted in the 
lifeworld suppresses not only reasonable questioning, but also reasoned reflection and the posing 
of questions about meaning: 
“Technologization not only tears apart the foundational context from which theoretical 
questions emerge in the lifeworld, but it also starts to regulate the lifeworld by leveling 
all distinctions between that sphere in which we do not yet ask questions and that in 
which we no longer ask questions, and in which the occupation of this object-space is 
controlled and motivated by the immanent dynamics of the technically always-already-
finished (“Immer-Fertigen”), by the irrefutablity of production which is identified with 
natural power.” (ST 190) 
Although Blumenberg is encouraged by the hope that reason can overcome this relationship and 
the inevitability of inaccessibility, the objection as such becomes visible as a kind of negative 
film on which reason has to work, although the success of this work is by no means 
guaranteed. The situation is similar when in 1966/67 Blumenberg diagnoses part of the malaise 
of his era, which is that “today we live in a scientific-technological world with a largely pre-
scientific and pre-technological consciousness” (GT 28), which is because we have not yet 
emerged from the antithesis between nature and technology. Here, too, it is indisputable that 
Blumenberg hopes that this ‘emergence’ is possible, but it is not guaranteed. But Blumenberg’s 
diagnosis of our era is a fact, something that no doubt is true in our space. 
The third objection offers as a thesis an idea that is particularly prominent in Anders’s work, and 
which Anders thinks through to its ultimate consequences. Technology becomes an enemy of 
Man, one that not only competes with human beings but also makes them dependent on itself. In 
other words, technology makes demands on people, even if these are basically only internalized 
human demands. The key point here is that Man is not able to see through this logic of 
internalization. This thesis can be found in its purest and clearest form in a very early text by 
Blumenberg, “Atomic Morality – A Counterpart of the Nuclear Strategy” 1946: 
“The qualitative and quantitative progress of technological production, however, leads to 
the growing differentiation and ultimate separation of the planning and production 
processes, whereby the clear focus on predefined purposes and intentions, the full insight 
into the overall structure of individual production is lost. The impulses and demands no 
longer depend on the human and social prerequisites, but on the technical product in 
itself, which is strongly supported by the related autonomous structure of the economy. It 
overturns its servile role, turning Man into the technician, entrepreneur and worker in its 
(i.e. technology’s) service. Indeed, it dictates to the whole of human society the needs and 
the purposes which are no longer the ones which Man has given himself.” (ST 10-11) 
Even in this text, Blumenberg makes it clear that despite this diagnosis of the dangers of 
technological progress, which had also revealed themselves to a terrible extent after the atomic 
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1946, he rejected the one-sided technophobic 
demonization of technology (see ST 11). The insight and formulation of this idea, however, does 
not simply disappear with the Blumenberg of the 1960s, but rather appears again and again in 
work of this period. In 1957, Blumenberg observes that the physical constitution of Man “is 
frustratingly unable to meet” the demands imposed on it by “technical work” (ST 95). And in 
1963, in “Lifeworld and Technologization according to Phenomenology”, Blumenberg tells us 
that the already finished product in turn imposes needs and meanings, for instance by “artificially 
creating a whole layer of fictional motives and values, which are themselves created by technical 
effort” (ST 190). What must be kept in mind is the fact that Blumenberg is by no means blind to 
those correlations that are at the center of technophobic arguments. Blumenberg does not 
demonize these correlations, but he notes them and shows that they are to be billed. One could 
also express the difference as follows: according to Blumenberg, we are not hopelessly at the 
mercy of these correlations (though this is hardly the case according to a philosophical 
technophobic), which does not mean that they do not exist. The quasi-paradoxical ambivalence 
of this mode of reflection lies in the fact that these correlations point at their core to something a 
fortiori uncontrollable – and the word “uncontrollable” means here that the possibility of control 
is simply not given nor exists – but which is nevertheless, at bottom, still controllable. 
The ambivalence of this specific argument can, I think, be tied to a broader ambivalence present 
in Blumenbergian reflection, one already stated above: on the one hand, its sober and objective 
endeavor for rationality and anti-dogmatism, on the other, its sensitivity towards the 
uncontrollable and that which transcends reason. 
 
Put in Positive Terms: Sensitivity towards Boundary-Crossing Utopias 
I would now like to show that Blumenberg’s aforementioned sensitivity towards 
the uncontrollable or inconceivable also presents itself in an inverted, positive form. One of 
Blumenberg’s central theses in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, one which in other writings 
he explicitly ties to the phenomenon of technology, is that the dissolution of the tight connection 
between the “God’s natural world and Man’s world of work (Werkwelt)” and the lack of faith in 
God as finis omnium naturalium is the “basic presumption of modernity and its essential 
technicity” (GT 126/127). In an alternative, perhaps more precise, formulation, one can say that 
at the end of the Middle Ages a technological will first consciously encounters an estranged 
reality in order to bring about a “new humanity” through the force of technology (GT 33/34). 
In many of his texts, Blumenberg now appears to affirm the ancillary thesis that man at the 
beginning of the modern age is now free to undertake the infinite task of self-assertion and self-
definition. This becomes especially clear in “Lifeworld and Technologization according to 
Phenomenology”, when Blumenberg adds his own voice to Husserl’s critical commentary. The 
context is the following: In contrast to Husserl, Blumenberg advocates that we shouldn’t 
stigmatize the mechanization (i.e. a formalization or functionalization) of knowledge as a simple 
deficiency (since once mechanical knowledge is attained it returns into obscurity), but as a 
legitimate and necessary tribute, the price that is necessary to pay, if one, like Husserl, dreams of 
the “realization of the mankind of infinite tasks” (ST 194). Methodization, according to 
Blumenberg, is enforced by the fact that science in the modern age understands itself as an entity 
that embodies the “infinite claim[s] of a finite being”. Curiositas, formerly condemned as the 
greatest evil, is now freed from any dogmatic shackles and is thus able to take up defiantly the 
gulf between infinity and finitude. This is a hallmark of the new, modern technicity (Technizität), 
which sees lou-cura (madness), as a limit case of cura / curiositas, as an exciting attraction 
rather than as a mortal sin. In this way, Man is freed to engage in the limitless exploration both 
of his own potential and of nature. With Francis Bacon, Blumenberg tells, we see the task of 
“leading the human spirit from what is to what can be” raised “to the task of historical 
reflection” par excellence (GT 60). This liberation oriented towards the realization of one’s own 
possibilities is closely linked to Blumenberg’s understanding of philosophy and technology. As 
Blumenberg tells us at the beginning of “World Images and World Models", the usefulness of 
philosophy in history can be summed up in one basic formula: “Philosophy is Man’s nascent 
awareness (Bewusstsein) of himself” (ST 127), and this awareness is the more complete, the 
more capable it becomes to realize all human possibilities. But it is not simply a matter of 
theoretical self-assurance, but also an active implementation in practice. Man, as Blumenberg 
had already stressed in 1953, is not only the being which produces technological structures, but 
rather “a being that realizes himself technologically, and whose “truth” is fundamentally 
technological” (ST 49). The publishers of Intellectual History of Technology, Alexander Schmitz 
and Bernd Stiegler, stress in the book’s epilogue, entitled “Editorial Note”, that this insight into 
the nature of human beings as auto-technological beings still or even especially applies to 
Blumenberg after he had turned towards a moderate anti-demonization stance regarding 
technology. This is because this insight does nothing but draw out the consequences from the 
bilateral interaction between mind and technology, theory and practice, which is the foundation 
for Blumenberg’s critique of false unilateralism (cf. ST 140/141). 
But the fact is, while connecting the auto-technological nature of Man to the still unexhausted, 
unrecognized and uncontrolled not-yet (“Noch-Nicht”), the reflection on bilateralism as 
fundamental is nevertheless insufficient to wipe the table clean from both the charms and 
dangers of this not-yet. That Blumenberg too repeatedly shows himself to be open to the appeal 
of the speculative and the unanswerable questions, is visible not only at certain stages of his 
thinking, but is indeed a basic feature of his work. A good example of this is the rather early 
essay entitled “‘Imitation of Nature’: Toward a Prehistory of Creative Man” (“‘Nachahmung der 
Natur’ – Zur Vorgeschichte des schöpferischen Menschen”), which culminates in the speculative 
thesis that particularly in the originating-creative acts of art – and one may very well add the 
closely related technological creativity – one comes to an ascertainment of the potential of 
Being, which ultimately becomes a path in which the eternally existent is manifested and 
revealed in the totality of its possibilities, including its contingencies. Man, and especially the 
artistic man, as a vehicle for the disclosure of cosmological and ideal potentialities – that is, 
according to Blumenberg, an idea that underlies the thought of great philosophers like Kant and 
Leibniz, and great artists such as Paul Klee, an idea whose appeal is quite rationally grounded. It 
is in my view no contingency, but perhaps a sign of his time, that Blumenberg ultimately assigns 
to art the role of being a replacement for metaphysics. In the aforementioned article, art is called 
a “metaphysical activity,” namely one that is not committed to any specific dogma, although this 
thesis can itself be charged with being dogmatic on a meta level. Closely related to this issue are 
Blumenberg’s later works on metaphorology, and this not just because it is there that 
Blumenberg calls "the loss of metaphysics” a “putting the metaphorical back in its place” 
(AEMS 144). Rather, the concept of metaphorology in Blumenberg is based on the question of 
whether the seemingly infinite number of combinations and recombinations of metaphors is a 
kind of exhaustion of a predefined boundary of potentialities or whether it leaves room for the 
idea that something completely new could arise from this predetermined material. This question 
seems to get lost not only in the realm of metaphysical speculation, but it also seems to motivate, 
in various ways, some of the major technophobic ideas such as those of Heidegger or Derrida. I 
cannot investigate this question further, but I would now like, in conclusion, to offer some 
questions and problems that may arise from the analysis I presented. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The analysis I have presented thus far should, as I have expressed above, show that there is an 
“ambivalent philosophical pathos” underlying Blumenberg’s philosophy. On the one hand, 
Blumenberg understands, especially from the 60s on, when he embraces anti-demonization and 
begins to trust in the power of reflective reason, that the bilateral interaction of practice and 
theory is of the utmost importance, especially for an ethical assessment of technological 
progress. This ethic is therefore fluid (or ‘liquid’, using the term introduced by Bauman) because 
it has to decide on a case-by-case basis, because it has to resort to specific contexts and because 
it lacks a general and universal metaphysical foundation qua worldview. It would be wrong to 
interpret this shortcoming as a demonic fatum and so to declare a priori that the enlightening 
function of reason is bankrupt. 
On the other hand, Blumenberg’s option to defend anti-demonization does not imply that he 
denies the existence of the crucial conditions that the “demonologists” point to. That 
technological advances can escape the control of people, that they are placed at a distance that 
can hardly be bridged by the human imagination and feeling, that technical objects can present 
themselves to Man with their own paraethical demands, all of that is stated by Blumenberg, 
though all of it is seen through the lens of a “hope and trust in reason.” Ethical demands for 
reasonable control, when they take in account real dangers, are fluid because they are located in a 
boundary area in which the ethical is at risk of saying something only to the most enlightened, 
while the general public no longer understands the crucial point. 
As to Blumenberg’s subdued fascination with the full exploitation of human and possibly natural 
potentialities, there seems to be an understandable sympathy for what Blumenberg himself has 
worked out as the fundus and engine of modern curiositas: the freedom to pursue these without a 
bad conscience, even if their opponents continue to peddle the negative anti-image, that of 
curiositas which slides into madness – lou-cura. I conclude here with a metaphor: The ethics 
would be fluid here because it dares to enter the ‘slippery’ terrain of what, due to its 
indeterminacy and inaccessibility, eludes a sound ethical debate.  
The fundamental question that pervades most demonological discourses on technology, is 
whether man has the capacity to meet the requirements of technological development, or, in 
other words, whether he lags so hopelessly behind technological development that he can only 
remediate his increasing inferiority by applying his technological know how to himself as a 
species, with the result that he would in fact become something other than what he is. This is a 
concern Blumenberg cannot really defuse. 
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